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No  recent  development  in the  U.S.  labor market  has been more  dramatic  and troubling  than  the 
collapse  in  the  buying  power  of  worker’s  paychecks.  After  rising  for  almost  three  decades, 
average  real  weekly  earnings  among production  and nonsupervisory  workers  fell by 7.5 percent 
between  1973 and  1979, and by  another  12.6 percent  between  1979 and  1990. This translated 
into  a decline  in weekly pay from $303 in 1979 to  $277 in 1982, and further to  $265 in 1990 (in 
1982  dollars).’  According  to  Lynn Karoly’s (1994) calculations,  the bottom  2Sh percentile  of all 
male  wage  and salary workers  average weekly  earnings fall from $259 in  1973 to  $242 in  1979, 
drop to just  $209 by  1984, and then rebound  slightly to $218 in 1989 (in 1986 dollars). 
This  drop in the value  of  wages  coincided  with a sharp increase in earnings inequality.’  Perhaps 
the  most  highly  publicized  characteristic  of  recent  earnings  trends  has  been  the  widening  gap 
between  highly  educated  and poorly  educated  workers.  Two wage trends  stand out  in the  1980s 
(see  Table  1).  First,  the  real  earnings  of  college  educated  female  workers  grew  rapidly  (14 
percent),  and second,  the  earnings  of poorly  educated  men declined  substantially  (20 percent  for 
those with less than a high school degree and 11 percent for those with just  a high  school  degree). 
Although  real  earnings  among  low-skill men, as measured  by educational  attainment,  also fell in 
the  1970s  the percentage  declines were three to four times larger in the  1980s  a decade in which 
the average earnings  of male college educated workers increased modestly.3 
These  data  indicate  that  the  growth  in male  earnings  inequality  across  education  groups  in the 
1980s  was  due  mainly  to  the  sharp drop  in the  earnings  of low-skilled  men.  More  importantly, 
over  the  course  of this decade there was a huge decline in the share of  low-skilled  workers  able 
to  rely  on wage  earnings  to  keep  a family out  of poverty.  Acs and Danziger  (1993)  report  that 
between  1979 and  1989 the incidence of “low earnings,” defined as earnings less than the poverty 
line for  a family of four, rose from 8 to  15 percent  for employed male high school  graduates,  and 
increased  from  13 to  30  percent  for  men  with  only  some  high  school.  The  problem  of  low 
earnings  was  substantially  worse  for black  and Hispanic men:  25 percent  of all employed  black 3 
men  and  41 percent  of  all employed  Hispanic  men with  less than  a high  school  degree  earned 
poverty-level  incomes  in  1989, far above their  1979 levels (Acs and Danziger  1993). 
Although  supply-side  changes  appear  to  provide  a reasonable  explanation  for  the  modest  wage 
growth  experienced  by the most well-educated  men in the  1980s4 this collapse  at the bottom  of 
the  earnings ladder is almost universally attributed  to downward  shifts in the demand for low-skill 
workers.  According  to  this  view  it was the  growing  mismatch  between  the  skills demanded  by 
firms and those  supplied by the workforce  that was mainly responsible  for reducing  wages among 
the  low-skilled.  Reflecting  this  skill mismatch  perspective,  Secretary  of Labor  Robert  Reich  has 
recently  attributed  rising  shares  of  poverty-wage  workers  and  growing  wage  inequality  to  the 
“mismatch  between  the  skill Americans have and the  skills the  economy  requires.  .  .  .  The long- 
term  crisis  in advanced  industrial  nations  reflects  in part  a shift in relative  labor  demand  against 
less-educated  workers  and those  doing  routine  tasks  and toward  workers  with  problem-solving 
skills” (Reich  1993). 
The  most  widely  accepted  explanation  among  economists  for  the  presumed  skill  mismatch  is 
technological  change  in  the  workp1ace.j  Although  controversial,  it  has  also  been  argued  that 
another  factor  contributing  to  the  shift in the  demand  for  skills is growing  import  competition 
from  low-wage  developing  countries,  which  has  reduced  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers, 
particularly  in trade  sensitive  industries.  At  least part  of the  popularity  of the  technology-trade 
story  can be found  in its apparent  consistency  with the empirical evidence  on the  skill upgrading 
effects  of computer-based  workplace  technologies  and the  growth  in the  share of imports  in the 
1980s. 
But  the  technology-trade  story  is  also  attractive  because  of  its  consistency  with  the  simple 
neoclassical  (demand  and supply) model  of the  labor market.6 Assuming that  there  have been no 
major  changes  in  the  supply  of  low-skill  workers,  a  decline  in  the  relative  wage  is just  what 
economists  would  expect  to  happen  if new production  technologies  and  growing  imports  have 
driven down the demand for low-skill labor. Without  changes in labor supply, a decline in demand 3 
for  low-skilled  workers  should lower both their wages and employment.  The implications  of this 
view  are obvious:  public policies  should attempt to raise the skills of the low-skilled  workforce. 
Unlike  the  simple textbook  model  of the labor market,  which provides  the intellectual  framework 
for  the  skill mismatch  story,  the  institutionalist  tradition  sets wages  not  only  by  the  forces  of 
supply  and  demand but by bargaining power  in the context  of wage-setting  institutions  and social 
norms. From this perspective,  an alternative  explanation  emerges, one that puts at center  stage the 
new  confrontational  approach  of  employers  and  a fundamental  shift toward  laissez-faire  public 
policies  that  can  be  clearly  seen  in the  late  1970’s, in the  midst  of  a  nationwide  productivity 
slowdown,  high inflation,  and growing trade competition.  But this shift from social well-being  and 
public  choices  to  individual  well-being  and market  outcomes  reflected  more  than just  changing 
business  conditions.  Since  other  developed  nations  faced  similar  economic  challenges  without 
resorting  to  a  dismantling  of  public  and  private  institutions  designed  to  protect  the  living 
standards  of low-skill workers,  the distinguishing  feature of the wage collapse  in the U.S. must be 
sought in the political  and ideological  realms. 
In  a  political  environment  in  which  government  policies  have  been  far  more  favorable  to 
employers  (and hostile to workers)  than in previous  decades (see for example Phillips,  1991)  and 
spurred  by  the  success  of  confrontational  labor  practices  by  some  highly  visible  large  firms  in 
trade-sensitive  industries,  long-accepted  practices  designed to  shield workers  from the  full force 
of  labor  market  competition  were  abandoned  by  employers.  “Effective”  management  became 
synonymous  with  “low-road”  wage  and  employment  policies,  which  included  challenging  the 
legitimacy  of labor unions  and collective  bargaining,  demands for wage and benefits  concessions, 
plant  relocation  to  low wage  sites, outsourcing  to  low wage  firms, and an increased  reliance  on 
low  wage  part-time  and  temporary  workers.  These  low-road  employment  practices  reflect,  in 
part,  increasing  pressure  from the financial sector  on management  to maximize  short-run  profits. 
Government  policy  also greatly  facilitated the low-road strategy by placing  the priority  on fighting 
inflation  rather  than  unemployment,  deregulating  key  industries,  weakening  the  enforcement  of 
labor  laws and  anti-trust  enforcement,  and by allowing  the  minimum wage  to  decline  sharply  in 4 
value,  which  undermined  the  wage  floor  that  had propped  up the  entire  lower  end  of the  wage 
structure. 
This  paper  assesses the empirical  support  for the  skill mismatch  story,  outlines  an institutionalist 
alternative,  and  contrasts  their  policy  implications.  The  first  part  of  the  paper  considers  the 
empirical  support  for  the  underlying  premise  of the  skill mismatch  explanation  for  the  earnings 
collapse:  Has there,  in fact, been a strong shift in demand away from low-skill workers?  Does the 
timing  of  employment  shifts  by  skill  group  across  industries  match  trends  in  computerization‘? 
Have  there  been observable  declines in low-wage  employment  shares and substantial  increases  in 
low-skill joblessness,  as the neoclassical  model would predict  if there is skill mismatch?  I find that 
the  answer  to  each  of  these  questions  is no  and  conclude  that  it  is  necessary  to  look  beyond 
supply  and  demand  shifts to explain the wage collapse. The second part of the paper represents  a 
tentative  first  attempt  to  do  this.  And  as  befits  a  Policy  Brief,  the  paper  concludes  with  a 
discussion  of the policy  implications  of the two explanations. 
Empirical  Evidence  of a Skill Mismatch 
Computerization  and  Shifts  in  the Demand  for  Skills 
A  critical  factor  raising  demand  for  more  skilled workers  relative  to  less  skilled 
workers  is  technological  change  that  favors  higher  skills.  In  the  1980s  the 
increased use of microcomputers  and computer-based  technologies  shifted demand 
toward  more  educated workers.  .  .  .  Whether because of computerization  or other 
causes,  the  pace  of  relative  demand  shifts  favoring  more  skilled  workers 
accelerated  within  sectors (Freeman and Katz 1994). 
There  has  been  an  across  the  board  increase  in the  ratio  of  skilled  to  unskilled 
workers  employed within each industry, in spite of the rise in relative wages of the 
skilled  (Krugman  1994). 
As these  passages  suggest, it is widely accepted  among economists  that  a large and accelerating 
shift  in  demand  away  from  low-skill  workers  characterized  the  decade  of  1980s. Undoubtedly, 5 
part  of  the  attractiveness  of  the  skill-shift  story  is  the  seeming  plausibility  of  skill-biased 
technological  change  as the  source  of the  demand  shifts. The rapid  diffusion  of computer-based 
production  technologies  and  an increasingly  competitive  environment  since the  early  1980s has 
made  popular  the view that the old regime of large, integrated,  capital-intensive  plants relying  on 
low-skill  manual  labor  is being  transformed  into  a  new  production  system  made  up  of  small, 
flexible, technologically  advanced  firms dependent  on an elite cadre  of highly  educated  workers. 
Unlike the traditional  “Taylor&”  model, the new “high-performance”  workplace  requires workers 
who  must  possess  the  cognitive  and  diagnostic  skills  necessary  to  perform  a  broad  range  of 
frequently  changing  tasks.  Workers  with  obsolete  or  insufficient  skills  will  get  paid  less  and 
ultimately  lose their jobs,  leaving behind a more skilled workforce. 
But there  are some problems  with this story.  Harrison  (1994) has convincingly  argued  that  small 
firms tend  to  be the  least technologically  advanced  and to  employ workers  at the  lowest  wages. 
Recent  research  has  consistently  shown  that  high-performance  workplaces  tend  to  be  in  large 
establishments.  A  1993  survey  by the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor  gathered  information  on  the 
presence  of  six possible  “alternative  work  practices”  in  establishments  commonly  cited  as  the 
hallmarks  of  high-performance  workplaces.  The  results  show  that  in  only  about  20 percent  of 
large  establishments  (defined  as having more than 50 employees)  was there  evidence  of just  two 
of  these  practices,  and  only  6 percent  of these  establishments  reported  having  implemented  as 
many  as four  alternative  practices  (Gittleman,  Horrigan,  and Joyce  1995). These  figures  suggest 
that  even  by the  early  1990s only a very small share of establishments had been transformed  into 
high-performance,  and, presumably, high-skill  workplaces. 
Yet,  it is widely  accepted  that  skill-biased technological  change  has produced  a collapse  in the 
demand  for  low-skill  workers.  Two  studies are often  cited to provide  empirical  support  for this 
“fact”  (Katz and Murphy  1992; Berman, Bound,  and Griliches  1994). A common  feature  of both 
studies is a focus on changes between business cycle peaks (1979  and 1989) rather than on annual 
trends.  While this methodology  is appropriate  for detecting  long-run trends and for analyzing  data 
whose  movements  are  extremely  sensitive  to  the  cycle,  focusing  on  endpoints  can  submerge 6 
important  information  about overall trends. 
Examining  manufacturing  industries  and  defining  the  skill  mix  of  employment  as  the  share  of 
nonproduction  employees  in total  employment,  Berman,  Bound,  and  Griliches  (1994)  point  out 
that  there  was  a large increase  in the  nonproduction  share of manufacturing  employment  in the 
1980s:  “Between  1979 and  1989 the  employment  of production  workers  in U.S.  manufacturing 
dropped  by a dramatic  15 percent  from  14.5 to  12.3 million,  while non-production  employment 
rose  3 percent  from  6.5 to  6.7 million.”  The  authors  interpret  these  trends  as evidence  that  the 
manufacturing  sector  experienced  substantial  skill upgrading  over  this decade  and conclude  that 
“biased  technological  change  is  an  important  part  of  the  explanation”  (Berman,  Bound,  and 
Griliches  1994). 
Since  the  diffusion  and  effective  use  of  computer-based  technologies  is  rapidly  increasing,  a 
technology-based  explanation  for  skill restructuring  implies that  the  decline  in demand  for  low- 
skill  jobs  should  have  become  progressively  greater  throughout  the  decade.  Indeed,  Berman, 
Bound,  and  Griliches  report  a rapid increase  in the rate  of growth  of computer  investments  as a 
share  of  total  investment  in manufacturing,  rising from 2.79 percent  in  1977 to  3.92 percent  in 
1982 to  7.49  percent  in  1987. Figure  1 shows that the real investment  in office,  computing,  and 
accounting  machinery  per  full-time  equivalent  worker  took  off after  1983 in both  manufacturing 
and  service  industries,  increasing  from  less than  $200 per  full-time  worker  in  1982 to  between 
$600  and $700 per worker  in 1989. By 1992 computer  spending ranged  from $900 per worker  in 
services to over $1,000 in manufacturing. 
Yet,  the  employment  trends presented  by Berman, Bound,  and Griliches show that virtually  all of 
their  observed  skill  upgrading  took  place  in  1980,  1981,  and  1982-well  before  computer 
spending  took  off.’  Indeed,  their  data  indicate  that  the  nonproduction  share  of  employment  in 
1989 was  identical  to  the  share  six years  earlier.  It  is worth  noting  that  real  production  worker 
wages fell continuously  from  1979 to 1993 (Mishel and Bernstein  1994a). 7 
Figure  2 provides  data  on  the  nonproduction  employment  shares  for  durable,  nondurable,  and 
total  manufacturing  between  1970 and  1992. The graph shows that the change in this measure  of 
the  skill  mix in manufacturing  can be traced  largely to  developments  in the most  trade-sensitive 
sector-durable  goods  manufacturing-between  1980 and  1982.  The  share  of  nonproduction 
workers  in this sector  increased  sharply, from 28.6 percent  in  1979 to  33.8 percent  in  1982, and 
then  fluctuated  between  33.2 and 34.1 percent  over the next  10 years. Although  Berman, Bound, 
and  Griliches  note  that  employers  use recessions  to  restructure,  there  is no  evidence  that  there 
was  a  substantial  shift  in  skill mix in the  1990-1991  downturn.  If biased  technological  change 
explains skill shifts, why would the use of new workplace  technologies  cause a sharp skill restruc- 
turing  between  1980 and  1982 but  not  between  1983 and  1992, when  the  latter  period  was 
characterized  by a far higher rate of investment  in computer-based  equipment?’ 
Table  2 provides  additional  evidence  on the  stability of the  skill mix in manufacturing  after  the 
recessions  of  1980 and  1982. Between  1983 and 1988 the ratios  of craft to semi-skilled workers, 
technicians  to  clerical workers,  and professionals  to managers remained virtually  unchanged.  But 
as the  first row  shows,  the  ratio  of craft  workers  to  laborers  declined  steadily  from  about  4 in 
1983  to  3.4  in  1987  (it  then  rose  slightly  to  3.5  in  1988).  These  figures  do  not  suggest  a 
technological  transformation  of the workplace,  nor the magnitude  of skill restructuring  that would 
be  necessary  to  explain  the  enormous  earnings  declines  suffered  by low-skill  workers  over  this 
period. 
To provide  a more detailed portrait of shifts in skill composition,  skilled and unskilled  occupations 
can  be  distinguished  within  both  white-collar  and  blue-collar  occupations  separately  for  the 
manufacturing  and  services  sectors.  Skilled  white-collar  workers  can  be  defined  as  those 
employed  in managerial,  professional,  and technical  occupations,  while  low-skilled  white-collar 
workers  are in administrative  support  occupations.g Skilled blue-collar jobs include mechanics  and 
repairers,  construction  and  extractive  trades,  and precision  production  occupations,  while  low- 
skilled  blue-collar  jobs  refer  to  operators  and  assemblers,  transportation  and  material  moving 
occupations,  and laborers  and guards (Howell and Wieler  1996). As in the Berman,  Bound,  and 8 
Griliches  study,  skill shifts are measured  by changes in occupational  employment.  Although  skill 
upgrading  may  be  taking  place  within  occupations,  if  the  mismatch  story  is  right,  a  large 
movement  away from low-skill occupations  should be observed throughout  the decade reflecting 
the rapid increase  in computer intensity  after 1982. 
Figures  3a  and  3b  show  the  changes  in the  low-skill  shares  of  total  employment  per  low-skill 
worker  in both blue-collar  and white-collar  occupations  and the real value of investment  in office, 
computing,  and  accounting  machinery  (primarily  computers)  per  worker  for  manufacturing  and 
service  industries  between  1978 and  1990. Although  sharp increases  in computer  spending  per 
worker  can  be observed  after  1982, shares of low-skill  blue-collar  employment  remained  stable 
and  low-skill  white-collar  employment  experienced  only  modest  declines.  In manufacturing,  the 
low-skill  blue-collar  share  fell sharply between  1978 and  1982 (from  45.1  percent  to  about  40 
percent)  and remained  stable for the rest of the decade, while the share of low-skilled  white-collar 
workers  declined  fairly  steadily  between  1982 and  1990 (from  12.6 percent  to  10.6 percent). 
Consistent  with the growth  in computer  intensity,  almost all of the change in the clerical  share of 
employment  occurred after 1986. 
These  figures  indicate  that  there  was  significant restructuring  away  from  low-skilled  blue-collar 
jobs  between  1978 and the early  1980s and away from low-skilled  white-collar  jobs  at the end of 
the  1980s  in  both  services  and  manufacturing.  These  employment  trends  do  not  suggest  that 
computerization  had a strong effect on low-skill male employment  shares. This is the case even in 
so-called  ‘high-tech’  manufacturing  industries,  such  as  machinery,  electrical  machinery, 
instruments,  and transportation  equipment), which show similar. 
Another  primary  source of evidence for strong shifts in labor demand against low-skill workers  is 
Katz  and  Murphy  (1992),  who  conclude  that  “rapid secular  growth  in the  relative  demand  for 
‘more-skilled  workers  is a key  component  of any consistent  explanation  for rising inequality  and 
changes  in the  wage  structure  over  the  last 25 years.”  But  again,  the  employment  data  indicate 
that  the  skill  mix  of jobs  has  been  remarkably  stable  since  1983.  The  real  question  for  our purposes  is somewhat  different: Do demand and supply shifts alone offer a convincing  explanation 
for the collapse in real earnings among less-skilled workers? 
Table  3 presents  estimates  by Katz and Murphy  of changes  in wages,  changes  in the  supply  of 
labor and changes in the demand for labor in the  1970s and  1980s.‘” Their estimates  indicate  that 
although  there was a downward  shift in demand for low-skill workers  in the  1980s  it was modest 
and  similar in size to the  shift in the  1970s. If technological  change has indeed caused downward 
shifts  in  demand,  the  Katz/Murphy  evidence  indicates  that  these  shifts were  no  larger  than  the 
demand shifts in the 1970s  before computerization  could have played  any important  role. 
Supply,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  a huge  decline  (-40.9  percent)  after  increasing  in the  1970s 
(+18.7  percent).  But despite  far larger  declines in supply than  demand, wages  fell sharply  in the 
1980s (-15.8  percent  for high  school dropouts, -19.8  percent  for high school  graduates).  Within  a 
simple demand and supply framework,  it is hard to reconcile  the wage collapse  in the  1980s with 
these  demand  and supply numbers--the  large decline in supply relative  to the  decline in demand 
should  have  raised  low-skill wages in the  1980s relative to the  1970s. In sum, the evidence  does 
not  provide  strong  support  for the  mismatch view that  shifts in labor  demand  explain the  wage 
collapse. 
Joblessness  and  Low-Wage  Employment  Trends 
If the  1980s were  characterized  by a strong  “twist” in labor demand---that  is, a sharp downward 
shift  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers  and  an  upward  shift  in  the  demand  for  high-skill 
workers-for  a given workforce,  the  simple demand  and  supply model  predicts  that  we  should 
observe  growing joblessness  among  low-skilled workers  and a declining  share of employed  low- 
skill  workers  in total  employment.”  Moreover,  if the  pool  of  low-skill jobs  declines  relative  to 
total  jobs,  the  share of workers  employed  in them and paid lower wages  should be smaller. This 
section  examines the  evidence  for these two  predictions  - rising joblessness  and declining  shares 
of workers employed  at low-wages. 10 
Skill Mismatch  and Joblessness 
The  skill mismatch  explanation  predicts  an  increase  in joblessness  as the  demand  for  low-skill 
work  declines:  there is a growing mismatch between the number of low-skill jobs  and the number 
of low-skill workers.  Indeed,  high unemployment  and nonparticipation  rates  have been frequently 
cited  as evidence  of a decline in demand for low-skill workers.  Chinchui  Juhn (1992),  for  exam- 
ple,  infers from declining real wage and labor force participation  trends that  “job market  opportu- 
nities  have  .  .  .  deteriorated  significantly  for  less-skilled workers.”  Similarly,  Juhn, Murphy,  and 
Pierce  (1993) write that the  “fall in wages for the least skilled is symptomatic  of a fall in demand 
for low-wage workers”  and conclude  that “there are simply too few low-wage jobs  .  .” 
But were joblessness  rates,  in fact, higher  in the  1980s than  in earlier  decades,  and did they  rise 
over the course of the decade? Robert Topel(1993)  has shown that joblessness  increased  between 
the  late  1960s and  late  1980s. But  according  to  the  skill-biased  technological  change  story  the 
relevant  time  period  was  the  198Os, and  specifically  the  post-l 982  period.  However,  his  data 
show a clear upward trend in joblessness  only through the recession  years of 1980 and 1982. 
Changes  in the employment-to-population  ratio  do not suggest that there was a sharp contraction 
in job  opportunities  during  the  1980s for those  with  the  lowest  cognitive  skills.  For  nonwhite 
workers  the employment  rate rose from 55.2 percent  to 58.2 percent between  1979 and  1989. For 
youth  aged  16 to  19 years, the  employment  rate  dropped  during the decade by only  1 percentage 
point  (U.S.  Department  of Labor  1994). For  black males  aged 20 to  24 years-a  demographic 
group  as likely as any to be negatively  affected by a declining demand for low skill workers+he 
employed  share of the population  fell sharply from 72.6 percent  in 1973 to  53.9 percent  in  1982, 
but  then rose  steadily to 63.9 percent  in 1988. Thus, the employment  rate  for young  black men at 
the  end of the  1980s was about what it was in 1979. The data for other male groups  show similar 
trends (U.S. Department  of Labor  1989). 
For  all  25  to  34  year-olds,  the  unemployment  rate  was  5.2  percent  in  both  1979  and  1989. 11 
Unemployment  rates for high school graduates were about the same in these two years.  The rates 
for teenagers  and black workers, however, both were lower in 1989 than in 1979. Only those with 
less than  four years of high school (about  15 percent  of the workforce  in the mid-l 980s) show a 
higher unemployment  rate in 1989 than  1979 (U.S. Department  of Labor  1994). 
It  can  be  argued  that joblessness  among the  low skilled was too  high in the  198Os, and that  this 
surplus pool  of workers  was a necessary  condition  for the success of the confrontational  strategy 
adopted  by employers  to reduce  costs  and raise profits  in this decade.  But the  data  do not  show 
higher  levels of joblessness  in the  1980s than in the  197Os, and there is no evidence  of rising rates 
over  the  course  of  the  decade.  We  can  ask,  then,  if the  problem  is that  there  are  simply  not 
enough  jobs  due to the increasing  skill requirements  of new workplace  technologies  (and perhaps 
also due to trade  patterns)  in the  1980s  why did joblessness  and unemployment  increase  sharply 
in the  1970s but show little or no increase between  1979 and 1989? 
Skill Mismatch  and Low- Wage Employment 
The  simple labor market  model  assumes a close, if not perfect,  correspondence  between  the  skill 
and  wage  distributions:  higher  skilled  workers  are  paid  higher  wages.l”  If  it  is  true  that 
technological  change  and  trade  resulted  in  reduced  low-skill  job  opportunities,  as  the  skill 
mismatch  story  claims,  fewer  workers  should  have  been  paid  low  wages  (as  joblessness 
increased).13 
To  examine  this prediction,  I calculated  the  share of young  (16-39)  workers  earning  low wages 
and  the  share  with  low  educational  attainment.‘4  Low  earnings  are  defined  as  1.5  times  the 
poverty  level for an urban  family of three,  which,  for a full-time full-year worker,  amounts  to  an 
hourly  wage  of  $8.09  in  1988. Low-wage  workers  are  defined  as those  making  less than  this 
hourly  wage  (adjusted  for changes in costs  of living for each of the  four years  examined).  Low 
skill  is defined  as educational  attainment  that  does not go beyond high school.  While this is by no 
means  an adequate  measure of the skills required in the workplace  (see Howell and Wolff,  1991), 12 
it does  offer  a convenient  and familiar measure of cognitive  skills and may do a reasonable job  of 
capturing  relative  changes  in  skill requirements.  Since the  purpose  was  to  provide  insight  into 
current  labor market  conditions,  only those  in the first half of their  careers  (ages  16 to  39) were 
included in the analysis. 
The  results  show  that  the  share  of  employed  young  workers  with  low  educational  attainment 
declined  throughout  the  15year  period,  from  62.8 percent  in  1975 to  55.5 percent  in  1990, a 
decline  that  is consistent  with the  figures presented  by  Katz and Murphy  (1992).  Although  the 
technological  change  explanation  would  suggest  that  the  greatest  rate  of  decline  should  have 
taken place in the second half of the 1980s when the demand for skills presumably  accelerated  and 
those  without  adequate  skills dropped  out  of the  labor market,  the  data  indicate  that  the  most 
rapid decline  actually took place in the early  1980s. 
In  contrast,  the  low-wage  share  of  the  young  workforce  increased  from  50.6  percent  to  55.8 
percent  from  1975 to  1990, with the largest jump again occurring  in the early  198Os, findings that 
are  consistent  with  those  of  Acs  and  Danziger  (1993)  on  the  growing  incidence  of  low-wage 
employment. 
While  it  might  be  argued  that  these  shifts  simply  reflect  changes  in  the  composition  of 
employment,  the  same  trends  appear  at  the  industry  level,  particularly  for  goods  producing 
industries.  For  example,  between  1975  and  1990 restructuring  in  the  stone,  clay,  glass,  and 
primary  metals industry  (which includes steel) resulted  in a 9 percent  decline in the  share of low- 
skill  employment  (from 77 percent  to  70 percent)  but a 76 percent  increase in the  share paid low 
hourly  wages  (from  23 percent  to  40 percent).  The  communications  industry  saw its  low-skill 
share decline by 33 percent  (from 58 percent to 39 percent) and its low-wage  share increase  by 33 
percent  (from  22  to  29  percent).  Even  more  dramatic,  the  automobile  industry’s  low-skill 
employment  share declined by 6 percent  (from 76 percent  to  71 percent)  but its low-wage  share 
grew  by  142 percent  (from  17 percent  to 40 percent).”  Goods  industries  with a high-wage,  low- 
skill  workforce  appear  to  have  restructured  in  the  1980s  by  radically  lowering  wages  and 13 
gradually  raising  skill requirements--in  short,  by moving  in the  direction  of  the  typical  service 
sector workplace. 
In  sum,  these  data  do  not  provide  strong  support  for  the  skill-shift  story.  The  mismatch 
assumption  of strong  declines in labor demand should lead to sharp declines in low-skill  (and low- 
wage)  employment,  an effect that  is compounded  if the supply of low-skill workers  also declines, 
as  the  data  suggest  has happened.  Similarly, the  upward  shift in demand  for  high-skill  workers 
should  lead  to  an  increase  in  high-skill  (high-wage)  employment.  If  both  shifts  occur 
simultaneously,  as the  skill-shift  story contends,  we should observe  declining  low-skill  (and low- 
wage)  shares of the workforce  and accelerating joblessness  among the least skilled. But what we 
actually  observe  is stability  in the  skill distribution  after  1982, strong  increases  in the  low-wage 
share of employment  throughout  the decade, and little evidence  of deterioration  in unemployment, 
employment  rates or joblessness  between  1979 and 1989. 
Computerization  and  Earnings 
Workers  in the U.S., particularly  those with low education,  experienced  a collapse in wages in the 
1980s  but  there  is little evidence  of skill shifts, rising joblessness,  or declining  shares of workers 
paid  low  wages.  Is  there  evidence  suggesting  a  direct  link  between  skill-biased  technological 
change  - such as computerization  - and earnings?  What has been  established  is a statistical  link 
between  earnings  and the use of computers  on the job.  In an extremely influential paper,  Krueger 
(1993)  concludes  that  “the expansion  of computer  use in the  1980s can account  for one-third  to 
one-half  of the  increase  in the rate  of return  to  education.”  Although  it is hard to  argue with the 
statistical  analysis,  it seems fair -and  appropriate-to  challenge  the  substantive  meaning  of the 
statistical  association  that  is found  between  computer  use and wages.  Indeed,  a new  study that 
tests  this  relationship  with  U.S.  and  German  data  comes  to  the  striking  conclusion  that,  while 
Krueger’s  results  are replicated,  there  are  “similar wage  differentials  for  the  use  of  pencils  at 
work  as for computers”  (DiNardo  and Pischke undated).  They interpret their results to imply that 
the payoff to computer  use does not reflect “an actual productivity  differential.  Instead, the results 14 
taken together  seem to suggest that computer users possess unobserved  skills that are rewarded  in 
the  labor  market,  or that  computers  were  first introduced  in higher  paying  occupations  or jobs. 
We argue  that  all the results in Krueger (1993) can be interpreted  in this light.” It is worth  noting 
that  among the largest low-skill jobs  showing the largest declines in real earnings  are truck drivers 
and construction  laborers,  who  do not  use computers,  as well as cashiers  and retail  sales clerks, 
.  who do. 
Further  doubts  over  a substantial  role  for technology  in the wage  collapse  for  low-skill  workers 
are  raised  by  two  additional  studies.  According  to  Steven  Allen  (1993),  the  main  effect  of 
technological  change, which he measured by a proxy for R&D activity,  is on the earnings growth 
of the  most  highly  skilled workers.  As he puts it, “rising R&D activity  is associated  with  higher 
wages  for  college  graduates,  but  is completely  unrelated  to  wages  of other  educational  groups. 
This  implies that the correlation  between R&D and returns to  schooling  .  .  .  reflects  greater  wage 
growth  for  college  graduates  in R&D-intensive  industries,  rather  than  a negative  demand  shock 
for high school graduates employed  in those industries.” 
Mishel  and  Bernstein  (1994b) find that technology  (as measured by investment  in equipment  and 
computers  and the share of scientists and engineers in employment)  had no greater,  and perhaps  a 
lesser,  effect on wage inequality in the  1980s than in the  1970s. Indeed,  as the example of the use 
of scanning  devices by cashiers suggests, there is  evidence that the use of computer  technologies 
in production  can reduce the skill requirements  of many jobs  and increase job  opportunities  for the 
least skilled. 
Just  as there  is no  evidence  showing  an exceptionally  large  shift in the  demand  for  skills in the 
198Os, a convincing  causal link between  computers  and changes in the wage  structure  has yet to 
be established.  We need to turn elsewhere for a convincing  explanation  of the wage collapse. 
An Alternative  Story:  The  Political  Economy  of the Wage  Collapse 15 
Our  findings  call into  question  the  standard  model  of  the  labor  market  that  has 
dominated  economists’ thinking  for the past half century (Card and Krueger 1995). 
I  am  convinced  there  has  been  a  shift  on  the  part  of  the  business  community 
toward  confrontation,  rather than  cooperation  .  .  .  I believe leaders in the business 
community,  with  few exceptions,  have  chosen  to  wage  a one-sided  class war  on 
this country  (Fraser  1978). 
An  Institutionalist  Framework 
There  is  no  simple  way  to  accommodate  the  evidence  presented  above  within  a  conventional 
demand-and-supply  framework  in  which  the  distribution  of  wages  reflects  the  distribution  of 
skills.  As the  Card  and Krueger  passage  quoted just  above  demonstrates,  there  is an increasing 
willingness  to  challenge the framework.  Indeed,  there is a long tradition  among labor economists 
and labor relations  specialists that rejects the simple competitive  model of the labor market.  In this 
institutionalist  tradition,  the  forces  of  supply  and demand  set only  the  boundaries  within  which 
wages  are set; within these boundaries,  wage ranges are set for each job  and  individual pay is set 
within  each job.  In this view, wages are not  a simple determinant  outcome  reflecting  the  current 
state  of  supply  and  demand,  but  an  indeterminate  outcome  that  reflects  a  complex  process  of 
explicit or implicit collective  and individual bargaining between  workers  and management.  As the 
prominent  “neo-institutionalist”  Clark  Kerr  (1988)  puts  it,  “economists,  or  at  least  labor 
economists,  should be less concerned with studying solutions exactly determined  (and thus subject 
to  being  known  in advance)  and more concerned  with ranges of possible  solutions,  as Edgeworth 
and Pigou  and Lester (1952) have argued  .  .  .”  Supply and demand matter, but so do management 
strategies, worker militance  and organization,  and perceptions  of fairness and community  values. 
This  alternative  perspective  builds  on the  work  completed  during  the  early  post-war  period  by 
“neoinstitutionalists”  such as Dunlop,  Slichter, Kerr, and Lester  (see Kaufman,  1988).‘”  Within a 
certain  range,  employers  may,  for  strategic  reasons,  choose  high  or  low  starting  wages  and  a 
particular  wage-tenure  profile.  There are a variety  of reasons to suppose that employer  choice  and 
collective  bargaining  agreements  within a particular  wage-setting  environment  better  captures  the 
reality  of  how  wages  are  determined  than  the  conventional  demand-and-supply  model’s  set  of 16 
unique  wage-employment  equilibria.  The availability  of information  about  worker  performance, 
the  extent  of idiosyncratic  and firm-specific skills, the role of teamwork  in production,  the degree 
of price-making  behavior  in product  markets,  and the  share of labor in total  costs  varies  widely 
across  workplaces.  Where  the  marginal  product  of  a  particular  worker  is  unknown,  where 
variation  in effort has a substantial impact on marginal productivity,  and where the product  and/or 
labor  market  do  not  closely  resemble  the  competitive  prototype,  fairness  and  morale  will  be 
important  for the overall productivity  of the workplace  and wage-setting  will reflect  social norms 
of  fairness  (Akerlof  1992; Bewley  1995). If this  diversity  accurately  describes  the  environment 
within  which  wages are set, substantial differences in wages can be predicted  for a given level of 
skills across establishments,  firms and locations. 
Research  has  consistently  lent  strong  support  for  the  view  that  there  exist  wide  variations  in 
wages  for workers  with similar skills with no tendency to narrow  over time. John Dunlop  (1957) 
for  example,  found  that  the hourly  wages  of male truck  drivers  organized  by the  same union  in 
Boston  ranged  from  $1.20  for wholesale  laundry  to  $2.25  for magazines.  About  three  decades 
later,  Katz  and  Summers (1989)  calculated  noncompetitive  the  wage  differentials  that  remained 
after controlling  for all the individual characteristics  that might affect a worker’s productivity.  The 
results  showed  extremely  large  differences,  ranging  from  a  21.1  percent  premium  for 
transportation  equipment  workers  to  a  15.3 percent  penalty  for  apparel  workers.  In  an  earlier 
paper,  Krueger  and Summers conclude  that  “the inter-industry  wage  structure  cannot  possibly  be 
interpreted  as a competitive  outcome. 
Taking  the  Low-Road 
In  an  institutionalist  story,  changes  in  ideology,  politics,  notions  of  fairness,  and  labor  market 
institutions  join  the “economic”  forces of supply and demand to determine wage and employment 
outcomes;  as a result,  changes in the wage distribution  can take place independently  of changes in 
the  skill  distribution.  Although  we  sacrifice  the  elegant  simplicity  of  the  neoclassical  skill 
mismatch  story,  a  “political  economy”  story  that  is  founded  on  institutionalist  perspectives  is 17 
necessary to adequately  explain the collapse in the economic well-being  of low-skill  workers  since 
the late  1970s. 
There  is  considerable  evidence  of  a  fundamental  shift  in  wage-setting  norms  and  institutions 
toward  confrontation  in  the  late  1970s.  Not  surprisingly,  labor  union  leaders  and  industrial 
relations  experts  were  among the first to recognize  the  shift. In  1978 the president  of the United 
Automobile  Workers  (UAW), Douglas Fraser, wrote that 
The  leaders  of industry,  commerce  and finance in the  United  States  have  broken 
and  discarded  the  fragile,  unwritten  compact  previously  existing  during  a  past 
period  of growth  and progress  .  .  .  today,  I am convinced  there has been a shift on 
the part  of the business community toward  confrontation,  rather than  cooperation  . 
.  .  I believe  leaders on the business community,  with  few exceptions,  have  chosen 
to wage a one-sided  class war on this country  .  .  .  (quoted by Gordon  1996). 
Academic  research  in the  early  1980s lends  support  to  Fraser’s  view  that  a profound  shift  by 
employers  towards  confrontation  over wages was underway.  According  to  Daniel B. Mitchell,  a 
new balance  of power had developed: 
The  longevity  of the (wage) concession  movement  and its spread to  less-than-dire 
situations  suggest that  the initial concessions  have encouraged  other  employers  to 
try their  luck in demanding  similar settlements  .  .  .  Management,  cheered  by what 
is perceived  as a shift in the balance of power, has changed its bargaining  goals  .  .  . 
The political  and legal climate change has been reflected  in a greater  willingness  of 
management  to take  actions  in labor disputes that might not have been publicly  or 
politically  acceptable  in the past...  Even  firms with  a long history  of unionization 
are using nonunion  labor (Mitchell  1985). 
Other  industrial  relations  experts  have confirmed  that  management’s  approach  to  the workforce 
shifted dramatically  in the early  1980s. Kochan,  Katz, and McKersie (1994) write that “now more 
than  ever,  the  U.S.  labor  market  is a place  where  anything  and  everything  goes.”  While  some 
firms adopted  high-road  employment  policies  and maintained  or increased  real wage  levels, most 
appear  to  have  taken  the  low-road,  adopting  employment  policies  aimed  at reducing  short-run 
labor costs.  As the authors put it, this new management  approach reflects  a “managerial  autocracy common  to  the  early  twentieth  century.”  Similarly,  according  to  former  Labor  Secretary  Ray 
Marshall, rather  than invest in the technology  and training necessary to create  “high performance” 
workplaces,  “. .  .  U.S. companies have been competing mainly through  reducing  domestic  wages 
and by shifting productive  facilities  to low wage countries” (Marshall  1992). 
What  caused  this  shift  to  the  low-road  by  employers?  Recent  economic  research  on  earnings 
inequality  has  focused  on  a  variety  of  possible  culprits:  technology,  unionization,  trade, 
immigration  and  the  minimum  wage.  The  problem  with  this  literature  is that  it  is  difficult  to 
generate  a coherent  story  since most  of the research  consists  of the impact  of one  or another  of 
these  factors  on wage  differentials.  Regression-based  studies that  attempt  to  “do it all” run into 
the problem  of inadequate  and interdependent  measures. I7 
Diagram  1 represents  an effort  to  outline  an institutional  explanation  of the wage  collapse.  This 
“political  economy”  approach  places the role of wage-setting  institutions  in a larger political  and 
economic  context,  drawing attention  to the importance  of, first, the political  and ideological  shifts 
that  began  in  appear  in  the  1970s (which  produced  laissez-faire  public  policies  and  growing 
hostility  towards  labor by public and private  sector policy makers),  and second, the globalization 
of product  and labor markets.  These were mutually  supporting  developments,  and both  served to 
increase  competitive  pressures-price  competition  among  employers  and  wage  competition 
among workers . 
The  effects  of globalization  are reflected  in two  key  developments  shown  in the  top  right-hand 
corner  of the diagram:  economic  growth  among less developed  countries  and the convergence  of 
all  nations  toward  U.S.  standards  of  living  (Baumol,  Blackman,  and  Wolff  1989)  and 
technological  advances  in communications  and transportation,  which has facilitated  international 
information  and trade  flows. While both  developments  characterize  the entire post-World  War II 
period,  with the  1970s  European  and Japanese  competitors  had caught  up and a major  upward 
shift in the technical  ability and incentive  to move production  to  developing  countries  took  place. 
Faced  with  a growing  threat  from imports  at the  same time that  opportunities  to  realize  lower 19 
labor  costs  through  outsourcing  and plant relocation  were increasing, many U.S. firms responded 
by making wage and benefits cuts their top priority.  But as the diagram indicates,  other developed 
nations  have  faced these  same pressures  and opportunities.  Only in the  United  States,  however, 
did  the  outcome  of  adjustment  to  globalization  generate  collapsing  real  wages  for  low-  and 
moderately-skilled  workers. 
The  distinguishing  feature  of the  U.S.  experience  has been the  massive political  and ideological 
shift in public opinion,  management  beliefs, and government  policy,  which facilitated  and actively 
encouraged  an  assault  on  the  wages  of  those  with  the  least  bargaining  power--the  low- 
skilled-by  employers.  This new political  context  is identified  at the top  left of the diagram.  It is 
widely  recognized  that  throughout  this  century  there  has  been  a  “public-private  cycle” 
(Schlesinger  1986): the  192Os, 1950s and 1980s stand out as periods in which public ideology  and 
government  policy  have  shifted  strongly  away from government  toward  market  solutions.  There 
are,  as  Hirschman  (1982)  puts  it,  “oscillations  between  periods  of  intense  preoccupation  with 
public  issues  and  of  almost  total  concentration  on  individual  improvement  and  private  welfare 
goals.”  Reflecting  such  a  change  in  national  preferences,  policies  initiated  during  the  Carter 
administration  set the  stage for the Reagan years and what Kevin Phillips (199 1) has called “one 
of America’s  ‘capitalist blowouts.“’  Phillips points to the ideological  underpinnings  of the radical 
redirection  of government  policy  and the predictable  consequences  for the distribution  of income: 
In each of the three great U.S. capitalist  eras .  .  .  genuine (laissez-faire)  philosophic 
and  cultural  conviction  expanded,  elevated,  and prolonged  the  wave  of capitalist 
expansion  .  .  .  the  resemblance  between  the  policy  framework  of the  1980s  the 
Coolidge  era  and  the  Gilded  Age  was  not  a  coincidence.  Striking  similarities 
existed  in  fiscal,  monetary,  deregulatory,  and  reduced-government 
approaches--and  led to  similar inequalities  of wealth  and income  distribution.  The 
new  economics  of  the  1980s had  gained  momentum,  to  be  sure,  because  of  a 
preexisting,  broader  national  conservative  trend  and  coalition,  reinforced  in  the 
late  1970s  by  a  larger  wave  of  inflation  and  popular  frustration  with  big 
government.  Yet it was absolutely  critical that reemergent  capitalism  also enjoyed 
something more: a missionary  spirit+nd  dedicated missionaries  (Phillips  1991). 
The  political  swing  from  public  action  to  private  interest  has  been  manifested  in  government 20 
policies  that  actively  promote  or facilitate market  solutions  and employer  interests.  Deregulation 
has  contributed  to  greater  competition  in product  markets,  particularly  in trucking,  airlines,  bus 
transportation,  and telecommunications-all  formerly  high-wage  industries.  The  decline  in anti- 
trust  enforcement  encouraged  the mergers  and acquisitions  that  led to the  restructuring  of many 
firms, often  at the  expense  of well-paid  workers.  President  Reagan’s  highly  publicized  attack  on 
the  air traffic  controllers  in  1981 set the stage for changes that weakened  both  labor  law and its 
enforcement,  and allowed  a 30 percent  decline in the value of the legal minimum wage.  A radical 
change  in  the  composition  and  leadership  of  the  National  Labor  Relations  Board  also  had 
profound  effects on the balance  of power between management  and workers.18 
Equally  important,  pressure  from  the  financial  sector  on  firms  to  adopt  short-run  profit- 
maximizing  strategies  increased  dramatically  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.”  A  good  example  is 
provided  by  Albert  Dunlap,  the  former  CEO  of  Scott  Paper,  who,  in  an  article  in  Harper’s, 
explains  that  “the  responsibility  of  the  CEO  is  to  deliver  shareholder  value.  Period.  It’s  the 
shareholders  who  own the corporation.  They take  all the risk. And how  does the  CEO maximize 
value?  He  does  that  by focusing  on profit.  .  .  .  sometimes you have to  get rid of people”  (Clara 
and  Noer  1996). Dunlap was  successful. According  to  Harpers,  “during  his two-year[s  at Scott 
paper]  he  increased  the  company’s  stock  price  by  225  percent,  laid  of  11,000  workers,  and 
arranged  for  the  company  to  be purchased  by Kimberly-Clark,  one  of its  biggest  competitors.” 
This  exclusive  concern  with  maximizing  shareholder  value  in  the  short-run  represents  a  new 
development  in  the  198Os, a  concern  that  would  have  been  socially  unacceptable  to  articulate, 
much less put into practice,  in earlier decades. 
Employers  responded  to  these  competitive  pressures  and opportunities  with  labor  practices  that 
reflected  the  prevailing  laissez-faire  thinking.  The  new  business-friendly  political  environment 
encouraged  “low-road”  management  strategies by employers.  By the end of the decade there  had 
been  a  fundamental  shift in the  human resource  policies  of  firms and the  legal rules  governing 
employment  practices.  As Wachter and Carter (1989) explain, 21 
Until  the  late  1970s or  1980s  firms rarely made use of their rights under Mackay 
Radio  to  hire  permanent  replacements.  Instead,  firms used  managers  to  replace 
striking  workers  temporarily.  When  replacement  workers  were  hired,  they  were 
seldom  offered  permanent  jobs.  When  strikes  occur  today,  replacement  workers 
are  more  likely  to  be  offered  permanent  jobs.  .  .  .  The  rules  governing  plant 
closings and relocation  are based on newer decisions  .  .  .  In simple terms, the rules 
mean  that  management  decisions  to  implement  partial  plant  closing,  work 
relocation,  asset  sales, and even some types  of subcontracting  are not  mandatory 
topics (for bargaining). 
Concession  bargaining  became  widespread  by  the  mid  1980s. Mitchell  (1985)  shows  that  the 
proportion  of workers  subject to major private union  settlements whose wages were frozen or cut 
ranged  from  0 percent  to 5 percent  from  1964 to  1980, rose to  8 percent  in 1981, and jumped  to 
44 percent  in 1982. The rate then fell to 37 percent in 1983,23  percent in  1984, and 26 percent  in 
1985. Just 2 percent  of settlements had no first-year wage increase in 198 1, but this figure rose to 
12 percent  in  1982 and ranged  from 25 to  37 percent  between  1983 and  1988 (Mitchell  1989). 
These data clearly indicate  a strong shift towards confrontation  by employers  in the early  1980s. 
The  relocation  of  operations  to  low-wage  sites has  also had  a downward  effect  on  the  relative 
earnings  of  many  low-skill  workers.  Although  statistical  evidence  is  hard  to  come  by,  the 
anecdotal  evidence  is  overwhelming.  For  example,  according  to  spokespersons  of  Pratt  and 
Whitney,  the  firms  decision  to  relocate  as many  as 9,000  high-paying  production  jobs  from  a 
high-skill  state (Connecticut)  to lower-skill  states (Maine and Georgia) was expressly designed to 
reduce  labor  costs  (Judson  1993).  Employers  such  as  Pratt  and  Whitney  have  evidently  not 
relocated  as a result  of  shifts in their  demand  for  skills and the  introduction  of  new workplace 
technologies  but, rather,  because they have revealed a preference  for paying much lower wages to 
the same workers  doing similar tasks.‘* 
Another  tactic  used to reduce  labor costs was to  substitute part-time  and temporary  workers  for 
permanent,  full-time  workers.  The  temporary  help  industry  grew  eight  times  faster  than 
employment  in all nonagricultural  industries between  1978 and  1985 and increased  from 620,500 
workers  in  1984 to  1,03 1,500 workers  in  1989 (Can-e  1992).  Based  on  Katharine  Abraham’s 22 
estimate  from an employer  survey that there were  1.5 million temporary  help workers,  short-term 
hires,  and  on-call  workers  in  1986, Cart-e estimates  that  there  were  over  2 million  “contingent” 
workers  by  1989. Relying  largely on the work  of Osterman  (1988)  and Golden  and Appelbaum 
(1990),  Cart-e (1992) concludes that it is “changes in firm demand for labor rather than changes in 
workers’  preferences  (that)  have  driven the rapid  growth  of contingent  labor  in the  1980s.”  She 
also  points  out  that  not  only  do  contingent  workers  offer  lower  labor  costs,  but  they  add 
flexibility--management  gains  greater  control  over  work  schedules  and  the  way  tasks  are 
performed. 
Government  social  policy  has  also  contributed  to  the  undermining  of  traditional  wage-setting 
norms  in the  private  sector.  The United  States continues to rely heavily  on employers  to provide 
health  insurance,  pensions,  child  care,  and  other  fundamental  benefits+enefits  that  represent 
labor  costs  to  employers.  These costs are assumed by the public sector  in most  other  developed 
countries.  As the costs of benefits rise, our  “privatized” benefits system encourages  employers  to 
substitute  part-time  and temporary  low-wage jobs,  increasing both the share of low-wage  earners 
and wage inequality. 
To  fundamentally  alter traditional  employment  and wage-setting  practices  within the firm, various 
institutional  changes  were  necessary.  Blackbum,  Bloom,  and  Freeman  (1990)  have  shown  that 
changes  in union  density and the value of the minimum wage both help explain the decline in the 
relative  wages of low-skilled men. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1993) present striking  evidence 
on the central role played by the declining value of the minimum  wage on the collapse  of wages at 
the  bottom  of the wage distribution.  They conclude that  “labor market  institutions  are at least as 
important  as supply and demand  considerations  in explaining  changes  in the  U.S.  distribution  of 
wages from  1973 to 1992” (1993). 
The  undermining  of traditional  wage-setting  institutions  may also help to  explain the  increase  in 
wage inequality  within  industry,  gender, education,  and experience  groups. Wage norms appear to 
have  broken  down within firms, as internal  labor markets  are opened up to external  competition), 23 
within  industries,  as increasing  competition  causes  differences  among  firms to  become  a  more 
critical  factor  in  wage  outcomes,  and  among  communities,  as  transportation  and 
telecommunications  facilitate  the  relocation  of  some, but  not  all, firms to  lower  wage  areas.  In 
short,  the  “law  of  one  price”  may  have  been  undermined,  not  promoted,  by  the  recent  wage 
restructuring.  Take,  for  example,  the  airline  industry.  With  deregulation  “employees  at  smaller 
carriers like Republic  actually  saw their pay go up when bigger airlines,  like Northwest,  took them 
over  and brought  in higher wage scales. But many have felt the pain as the competition  set off by 
deregulation  put relentless  pressures  on costs  .  .  .  (Bryant  1993). 
The  consequence  of low-road  employment  policies--the  war on labor unions,  demands for wage 
concessions,  plant  relocation,  outsourcing  and an increased  reliance  on contingent  workers-has 
been  declining  real  wages  for  those  with  the  least  skills,  and,  as  Bennett  Harrison  (1994)  has 
described  it,  a job  structure  that  is being transformed  from  one  with  a  diamond  shape  (lots  of 
good,  relatively  low-skilled jobs)  to one with an hourglass  shape (only the best and worst jobs  are 
expanding).  Similarly, Levy and Murnane (1992) conclude that “the male earnings  distribution  has 
‘hollowed  out,’  leaving  larger percentages  of workers  at the top  and bottom  of the  distribution, 
and a smaller percentage  in the middle.” 
Increasing  Supply:  The  Crowding  of Secondary  Labor  Markets 
A necessary  condition  for effective  low-road  management  strategies  is a large pool  of willing  (or 
desperate)  and  able  low-skill  workers.  Traditional  measures  of  labor  supply-the  number  of 
workers  in  a  particular  age-gender-education  grouwuggests  that  there  was  no  significant 
increase  in the low-skill  labor supply in the  1980s (Katz and Murphy  1993). However,  part  of the 
decline  in  bargaining  power  that  contributed  to  the  wage  collapse  may  be  traceable  to 
“unmeasured”  increases  in the  supply of workers  willing (or  required)  to  compete  for  low-wage 
jobs. 
As the middle of the earnings  structure  narrowed,  low-skill workers  have  crowded  into  a pool  of 24 
“secondary”  jobs  that  remained  a  fairly  constant  share  of  total  jobs  throughout  the  1980s 
(Gittleman  and Howell  1995), tending to lower the wages of what were already the worst jobs  in 
the  labor  market.  According  to  a recent  Department  of Labor  study (Herz  1991), more  than  4.3 
million  workers  were  displaced  during the boom years of  1985-89.21  Only 72 percent  had been 
re-employed  by  January  1990 and  of these,  about  10 percent  worked  part-time.  Among  those 
reemployed  full-time,  about  40 percent  earned  less in current  dollars  than  on their  previous  job. 
Not  surprisingly,  those  least  successful  in the  labor  market  after  displacement  were  high-wage 
blue-collar  men.  According  to  Herz,  “six  of  every  10  displaced  workers  in  this  industry 
(transportation  equipment)  earned less on their new jobs than on their old one, and more than half 
of this group suffered declines  of 20 percent or more.” 
The downward  effect of displaced high-wage  low-skill workers  on the wages at the bottom  of the 
earnings  distribution  can also be inferred  from research  by Robert  Topel  (1993).  Between  1979 
and  1988, he finds that  “nearly one-third of the unemployed  had predisplacement  wages above the 
60th  percentile,  and only  14 percent  are from the bottom  decile.  .  .  .  Among  displaced  workers 
with  prior  earnings  from  the  upper  four  deciles,  current  wages  are  about  half  of  their 
predisplacement  level.”  Defining  the  unskilled  as  those  with  low  wages,  Topel  interprets  his 
results  as  showing  that  “many of the  ‘unskilled’ who  are unemployed  or  out  of the  labor  force 
appear to have been high-wage  workers whose specialized  skills have become  obsolete.“*’ 
Despite  the  rising  average  premium  for a college  degree  relative  to  a high  school  degree  in the 
198Os, a weak job market has forced many lower-level white-collar  workers  with college  degrees 
to  compete  for  relatively  low-skilled  jobs.  This  became  particularly  pronouncd  at  the  end  of 
decade,  in the  “white-collar  recession”  of  1990-91.  Like  the  displacement  of  high-wage  blue- 
collar  workers  earlier  in the  decade,  this  weakening  in the  middle  of  the  earnings  distribution 
added  to  the  supply of workers  competing  in the low-skill job  market.23 There  is some evidence 
that  computer-based  technologies  and  corporate  restructuring  have  made  large  numbers  of 
middle-level  managers  redundant.  Howell  and  Wolff  found  (1992)  that  the  use  of  new 
technologies  had a downward  effect on the share of both managers  and clerical workers  between 25 
1970  and  1985.  Consistent  with  this  finding,  Kuster’s (1993)  case  study  of  the  commercial 
banking  industry  found that between  1987 and 1990 there was a 13 percent  decline (from 45,000 
to  39,000)  in  general  managers,  a  decline  from  2.9  percent  to  2.5  percent  of  total  industry 
employment. 
In support  of this twist in the skill mismatch  story, data from the Panel Study of Income  Dynamics 
(PSID)  show  that  in the  late  1970s about  40 percent  of the  sample reported  themselves  to  be 
“over-educated”  for  their  jobs  (Sicherman  1989). According  to  recent  reports  by  economists 
from  the  U.S.  Labor  Department,  throughout  the  1980s about  20 percent  of  college  graduates 
were  working  at jobs  that  don’t normally require  a degree, and this is expected  to  increase  to  30 
percent  at the end this decade (Hecker  1992, Shelley  1992). Declining opportunities  in the middle 
of  the  job  ladder  might  be expected  expected  to  have the  greatest  negative  impact  on minority 
workers.  In fact, the share of black and Hispanic college graduates with poverty-level  wages rose 
dramatically  in this decade,  from about  9 percent  to just under  15 percent.  If the unemployed  and 
those  who  had  stopped  looking  for  work  are  included,  the  incidence  of  low  earnings  among 
college  graduates  rose  from  14.6 percent  to  21.4 percent  for black  men and from  11 percent  to 
19.4 percent  for Hispanic men (Acs and Danziger  1993). It seems reasonable  to  assume that  one 
consequence  of declining opportunities  for moderately  skilled white-collar  jobs  has been to  force 
those  with training  for white-collar jobs to compete for jobs with low cognitive  skill requirements, 
contributing  a downward  pressure on their wages. 
Immigration  patterns  compounded  the downward  effect that displaced high-wage  workers  had on 
the  wage  rates  of low cognitive  skill jobs.  As Vernon  Briggs (1993) has documented,  there  was 
an unprecedented  increase in the flow of low skill foreign workers into the U.S. in the  1980s  both 
legal  and  illegal.  The foreign-born  share of the workforce  increased  from 6.4 percent  in  1980 to 
9.7  percent  in  1994  (Borgas,  Freeman,  and  Katz  1996).  Significantly,  this  recent  wave  of 
immigrants  is  far less skilled,  at  least in terms  of educational  attainment,  than  earlier  waves  of 
immigrants  in the  post-war  period.  Friedberg  and  Hunt  (1995)  report  that  43  percent  of  new 
immigrants  do  not  possess  the  equivalent  of  a high  school  degree.  And  according  to  a recent 26 
study  by  David  Jaeger  (1995),  employed  male immigrants  were  about  16 percent  of the  civilian 
workforce  with  less than  a high  school  degree  in the  nation’s  50  largest  metropolitan  areas  in 
1980; by  1990 this figure was over  30 percent.  For women  the growth  in this low-skill  imigrant 
share was almost  as spectacular,  rising from  17 percent to almost 28 percent. 
Although  the  econometric  evidence  on  the  effects  of  immigrants  is mixed  and  controversial,  a 
recent  paper  by Borgas,  Freeman  and Katz (1996) concludes  that  “immigrants  contributed  more 
to  the  decline  in the  relative  earnings  of high-school  dropouts  than  trade,  while  both  modestly 
reduced  the  earnings  of high-school  workers  relative  to  college  workers.”  Indeed,  it  is hard  to 
imagine how a large influx of low-skill workers during a period in which demand for the them was 
stagnant  or declining  would  not  have a downward  effect on workers  wages,  since these  workers 
compete  in the most unsheltered  parts of the labor market.  Not  surprisingly, therefore,  case study 
evidence  supports  this common-sense  view. In his study of the Los Angeles restaurant  and hotel 
industry,  Waldinger  (1992)  concluded  that  “the  story  of black  displacement  in restaurants  and 
hotels  can  be  traced  not  to  skill upgrading,  but  rather  to  competition  with  a rapidly  growing 
immigrant  population.”  Similarly,  a General  Accounting  Office study cited  by Jack  Miles (1992) 
found  that  “Janitorial  firms serving  downtown  Low  Angeles  have  almost  entirely  replaced  their 
unionized  black  workforce  with  non-unionized  immigrants.”  Again,  it appears  to  have  been  the 
drive to lower labor costs that explains this result. 
A Political-Economy  Explanation 
The  difficulties  posed by the measurement  and the interdependence  of the key determinants  make 
this  institutionalist  story easier to diagram than to statistically test. But the importance  of changes 
in  trade  patterns,  unionization  rates,  and the  value  of the  minimum  wage  on  relative  wages  in 
recent  empirical  studies  supports  this  approach,  as  does  the  anecdotal  evidence  on  wage 
concessions,  outsourcing,  plant  relocation,  and the use of contingent  and part-time  workers.  For 
purposes  of both  coherence  and policy making regarding the wage collapse,  it is crucial that these 
proximate  determinants  be understood  in the  larger context  of a new, more  competitive  business 27 
environment  in which political  and ideological  shifts have lifted the constraints  on the adoption  of 
the “low-road”  management  strategies. 
Other  nations  have  chosen  to  operate  under  different  labor  market  rules.  As Freeman  (1994b) 
points  out,  “the United  States represents  the  decentralized  extreme in wage  setting.”  Still,  since 
the  late  1970s  political  choices  have been made to  move  further  in this  decentralized  direction, 
and  wage-setting  institutions  that  had  once  provided  some  protection  of  the  forces  of  labor 
market  competition  have  been  undermined  or  dismantled.  It  was  no  coincidence  that  among 
developed  countries,  only Great Britain--also  relatively  decentralized-experienced  a comparable 
increase  in inequality.  But the U.K. experience was unlike that  in the United  States  in one crucial 
respect:  real earnings among the least skilled increased. The collapse of wages for those  with low 
educational  attainment  was a uniquely  American experience. 
Policy  Implications 
The  policy  implications  of  these  alternative  explanations  are  profoundly  different.  If  the  rising 
incidence  of  low wages  and the  growth  of earnings inequality  over the  last two  decades  can be 
attributed  to  declining  job  opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  due  to  technological  change,  a 
sensible  policy would be to reduce the share of workers  with low-skills.  The solution  to the wage 
collapse  is more  and better  education  and training,  and perhaps  a tougher  approach  to  legal and 
illegal immigration.  In sharp contrast,  the institutionalist  explanation  suggests reversing  the trend 
of  declining real  (and relative)  wages of low-skilled  workers  through  public policies  that  address 
not  just  worker  characteristics,  but  the  way  wage-setting  institutions  work,  both  inside  and 
outside the firm. 
Can  we  solve  the  earnings  problem  through  skill  upgrading?  Even  assuming  the  politically 
feasibility  of  what  would  be  an  expensive  program  (see  below),  there  are  a  number  of  key 
problems  with  attempting  to  address a problem  caused largely by a decline  in bargaining  power 
due to  changes  in labor market  institutions  and shifts in social norms with  a massive program  of 28 
skill  upgrading  for the  least  skilled. First, the payoff  to  investments  in “hard”  skills like  literacy 
takes  time.  It is hard to  imagine much impact on the wage  structure  in less than  one generation. 
Second,  many of the skills employers demand are “soft” skills that  concern work  habits,  attitudes, 
and responsibility--traits  that  are developed  in childhood  in families, schools,  and communities. 
Attempting  to significantly upgrade the soft skills of adults through government  programs  is likely 
to be even more challenging  than improving their hard skills. 
And  finally,  labor market  forces will tend to undermine the objectives  of skill upgrading.  Close to 
two-thirds  of  all jobs  are  currently  being  done  by  those  with  a  high  school  degree  or  less. 
Successful  skill  upgrading  for  the  workers  now  filling those  jobs  is only  part  of  the  task.  We 
would  also  need  to  supply jobs  to  those  workers  that  require  higher  skills and pay  them  higher 
wages.  Without  such job  creation,  a higher supply of moderately  skilled workers  will tend to bid 
down  the  wages  of  moderately  skilled jobs.  And  who  would  now  do  all  the  unskilled  jobs? 
Without  tougher  enforcement  policies,  a skill upgrading  program  runs the risk of increasing  the 
incentive  for illegal immigration,  A program that  succeeded in substantially increasing the skills of 
large  numbers  of  workers  currently  paid  low  wages  might  result,  therefore,  in  a more  highly 
skilled  native-born  workforce  that  experiences  declining  real  wages  at  the  same  time  that  the 
number  and share of  low-skill  foreign born workers  increases-a  replay  of our experience  in the 
1980s. 
If we  were  to  be more  optimistic  and suppose that  high-end  estimates  of the marginal  return  to 
investment  in education  and training  for individuals (say  10 percent)  can be applied to  the  entire 
low-skill  workforce,  the  cost to the public sector  of providing  the kind  of education  and training 
necessary  to  counteract  recent  earnings trends  would  be enormous.  Heckman  (1994)  has shown 
that  a  10 percent  return  on  investment  in human  capital  would  require  an  investment  of  $2 14 
billion  (1989  dollars)  to  restore  the  earnings  of  male  high  school  dropouts  to  their  1979 real 
levels.  A  further  $212  billion  would  be  required  to  restore  the  earnings  of  all  high  school 
graduates  to  their  real  1979 levels.  To  restore  the  earnings  ratio  between  earnings  of  college 
graduates  and earnings  of less educated  workers  to  the  1979 mark  would  cost more  than  $1.66 29 
trillion. 
Few will,  or  should,  oppose  public sector  efforts to raise the skill level of the workforce,  but the 
ability  to  of workers  to  perform  the  functions  required  in technologically  advanced  workplaces 
has had  little  to do with the startling  growth  in poverty-wage  jobs,  the drop in real earnings,  and 
the  growth  of  earnings  inequality  in the  1980s. We need to  improve  our  education  and training 
system  but  making  workers  smarter  will not,  by itself,  have  much  effect  on the  distribution  of 
earnings,  and certainly not within the next decade. Besides, most jobs  will continue  to require less 
than  a  college  degree,  and  a  labor  market  that  increasingly  offers  poverty-wage  jobs  to  these 
workers  provides  them with little incentive to invest in education  and training,  no matter how well 
we design and implement  such programs. 
Alternatively,  a popular  policy  that  can raise the  after-tax  incomes  of  low-wage  workers  is the 
earned  income  tax  credit  (EITC),  which  offers  a reduced  tax bill or  a rebate  check  based  on  a 
family’s  level  of  earnings  and  number  of  children.  The  EITC  has  been  an  effective  means  of 
modestly  raising the take-home  incomes of some low-wage  families. But in an era of heightened 
concern  over  the  budget  deficit  and  strong  resistence  to  redistribution  through  the  tax  code,  it 
seems  unlikely  that  the EITC  can be greatly  expanded.  The wage  collapse  has simply been too 
massive  for a redistributive  tax program  of this sort to offset more than  a small part  of the  losses 
experienced  by those  with  less than  a college  degree.  Furthermore,  heavy  reliance  on the  EITC 
has  the  perverse  effect  of ratifying,  and even encouraging,  the  very  practices  by employers  that 
produced  the need for the credit in the first place, namely, “low-road”  competitive  strategies  that 
reduce costs by targeting  the wages and benefits  of those with the least bargaining  power. 
An  effective  public  policy  response  must  address  the  roots  of  the  earnings  problem.  We  have 
come  to  rely  too  heavily  on  competition  in  labor  markets  to  set  wages  and  employment 
conditions.  The wage-setting  institutions  that  sheltered low-skill workers  from the worst  excesses 
of  labor  market  competition  and  encouraged  management-labor  cooperation  need  to  be 
reestablished  and the development  of new institutions  that can more effectively  serve this purpose 30 
should  be  explored.  While the  details of such a program  require  careful  debate,  the  direction  to 
take  is clear.  Strengthening  the  ability  of  workers  to  bargain  collectively  and reversing  the  35 
percent  decline  in value  of the minimum wage  since the  1960s would  be a good  place  to  start. 
While  collective  bargaining  agreements  set wage  and  employment  conditions  for  18 percent  of 
American workers,  they covered more than 80 percent of workers in Sweden, Germany,  Belgium, 
France,  and  Austria  (Freeman  1995). The minimum wage  in France  is set at  60 percent  of  the 
average wage, almost twice as high as that in the United States.‘4 
Indeed,  strong  labor market  institutions  currently prevail in varying  forms in all of our developed 
country  competitors,  and yet  these  nations  face the  same competitive  pressures  from  the  same 
global marketplace.  But unlike the United  States these nations  did not  allow their  labor unions  to 
be  crushed  in the  1980s. The  legal minimum wage  was  not  allowed  to  plummet  in value.  The 
balance  of  trade  in durable  goods  was not  allowed  to  collapse.  And in these  nations  the  public 
social  safety  net  was  not  dismantled.  We  should  take  the  advice  of  Richard  Freeman  (1994c), 
who,  after  summing up the lessons learned from a major study of labor markets  from around  the 
developed  world,  concluded  that “the declining position  of American workers  relative  to those  in 
other  advanced  countries  shows clearly that it is appropriate  to reconsider  our labor institutions  in 
light of experiences  elsewhere.” 
Faced  with  an increasingly  competitive  world,  U.S. policy  makers  and employers  made  choices 
that  reshaped  the way the U.S.  labor market  works,  making the most  decentralized  labor market 
among developed  countries  even more so. Low-skill  workers have paid the price for those choices 
in the  form  of sharply declining living standards, while higher-income  consumers  have benefited. 
This  massive  redistribution  of economic  well-being  cannot  be maintained  for long:  it undermines 
living  standards  and  morale  and,  hence,  the  productivity  of  the  current  workforce.  It  also 
undermines  our  ability to  prepare  the  next  generation  for productive  work  and  citizenship.  The 
low-road  of wage cuts and employment  insecurity will not create a high-performance  economy  in 
the long-run  and it is not the path being taken by most of our industrialized  competitors.  It is time 
to reclaim  control  over the way our labor markets function. 31 
Notes 
1. Average weekly earning were deflated by the CPI-U index (Council  of Economic  Advisers,  1991, 
Tables B-44 and B-58). 
2. “Overall, the gap in weekly  wages between men at the 10th  and  90th  percentiles  has grown about 
35 percent since 1967. In the recent period (since  1979), this growing gap is the result of substantial 
declines  in real wages at the bottom  of the distribution  and more modest  gains at the top”  Karoly 
1994, p. 56) 
3. The  increase  in earnings among workers  near the top  of the earnings ladder appears to be due 
exclusively  to the increased  earnings of those with post-graduate  schooling  (Mishel and Bernstein 
1995). From another perspective, the growth in pay at the top appears not to be a function  of whether 
or not  one has a college degree, but to an increase in earnings among the top  1 percent  of earners 
(Gramlich,  Kasten, and Sammartino  1994). 
4. Citing the work of Blackbum,  Bloom, and Freeman (1990) and Kosters (1992), Burtless  (1992) 
states that “the supply of highly skilled workers more than kept pace with demand through  the  197Os, 
when the wage premium for schooling shrank slightly. But the anemic growth of a highly  skilled labor 
supply in the  1980s led to a sharp rise in the premium for education  and skill.” 
5. In an influential  paper, Bound and Johnson (1992) assert that the “major cause [of relative  wage 
changes  in the  1980~1  was a shift in the  skill structure  of labor demand brought  about  by biased 
technological  change.”  Similarly, Acs and Danziger (1993) conclude that since most of the decline 
in earnings is found within industries for workers with the same education  and experience  levels and 
cannot be accounted for by the standard measures used in earnings studies, “changes in technology, 
whether autonomous  or in response to foreign  competition,  provide the most plausible  explanation 
for the fall in mean earnings.” 
6.  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1991)  are quite explicit about the reasons  for the recent  attention  to 
computerization  by labor economists:  “Skill-biased technical  change will play a major role  in any 
satisfactory  neoclassical explanation  for recent changes in the wage structure” (emphasis  added). 
7. Although they do not seem to think that the timing of restructuring  matters for their  story, the au- 
thors do recognize that employment  shifts were concentrated  in the  1980 to  1982 period.  “Roughly 
70 percent of the within-industry and over 80 percent of the between-industry  shifts  .  .  .  that occurred 
between  1979 and 1987 did so between  1979 and 1982” (Berman, Bound, and Griliches  1994). 
8. The timing of these employment and investment  trends is also relevant  to the interpretation  of the 
regression  results presented  in the Berman, Bound,  and Griliches study.  They regress the  1979 to 
1987 change in the nonproduction  share of employment  across industries on the level and change in 
the share of computers in total investment.  Their estimated coefficients  are positive.  They conclude 
that this measure of technological change accounts for “one-quarter to one-half  of the within-industry 
move  away  from production  labor that  occurred  over the  1980s” (Berman, Bound,  and Griliches 32 
1994). Is it plausible that investments in computers, which took place almost entirely  after  1982, can 
explain up to  half of the  shift away from production  labor, which occurred  entirely  before  1983? 
Interestingly, they note that their  1977 to 1987 computer variables  as well as their  1974 measure  of 
R&D are also powerful predictors  of nonproduction  employment  trends for 1959 to  1973, a period 
with virtually  no computer investment. 
9. Because sales jobs range fi-om low- to high-skilled  (from cashiers to insurance  agents), those jobs 
were considered as a separate category. Private household  and farm occupations  were omitted  from 
the analysis. 
10.  These  figures  are taken  from three  different  tables.  The wage  and  supply  estimates  are  for 
workers  with  one  to  five years  of  experience  while the  demand  estimates  are for workers  at all 
experience levels. My interpretation of these results requires an assumption that the change in demand 
for all low-skill  workers is not dramatically  different from the change in demand for those with one 
to five years of experience. 
11. Since the simple demand-and-supply  model assumes that the wage distribution  mirrors the skill 
distribution,  changes in the wage distribution  should reflect changes in the skill distribution.  In this 
case, we should observe a decline in the share of those employed  at low wages. While  a surplus pool 
of low-skill workers will push the wage down, the mismatch  (skill twist) story posits declining  low- 
skill job  opportunities  so that the pool  of jobs  for which these low-skill workers  are competing  is 
shrinking. 
12. This assumption is made explicit and relied upon in many empirical  studies. For example, Topel 
(1993)  writes  that  “I will define relative marketable  ‘skills’ in terms  of a person’s  position  in the 
overall  distribution  of wages.” 
13. Those with low skills lucky enough to get the increasingly  scarce jobs may see their wages bid 
down,  but  there  should  be fewer workers  employed  in this  low-skill job  pool  and more jobless 
workers. On the other hand, the presence of too many low-skilled  workers should not directly  affect 
the  wages  for higher  skilled jobs  since the low-skilled are not, presumably,  easily substitutable  for 
higher  skilled workers. 
14.These values were calculated for four years: 1975 (the earliest year for which hourly earnings can be calculated from the 
Current  Population Suwq),  1979, 1984 and 1990. Two of these years, 1975 and 1990, are recession years. Replacing these 
with 1976 and 1989 has no effect on the trends presented here. 
15. These estimates  are conservative  since temporary workers, whose share of employment  greatly 
expanded in the  1980s  are defined as service sector workers and are not included  in the data. 
16. Kaufman (1988) writes that “as DKLR [Dunlop, Kerr, Lester, and Reynolds]  intuited,  and Walter 
Oi (1962) and Gary Becker (1964) later showed more rigorously,  firm-specific training  creates  its 
own  area  of indeterminacy  in wage rates-competition  places upper and lower limits to the wage 
bargain, but within these limits the wage is indeterminant until explicitly  set by unilateral management 
decision, individual  bargaining,  or collective bargaining.” 33 
17. For a survey of the literature on the effects of trade, see Burtless (1995). For the effects on unions 
and the minimum wage, see Blackburn, Bloom  and Freeman (1990); Freeman (1994a); and DiNardo, 
Fortin,  and  Lemieux  (1994).  For a comprehensive  treatment  of the  effects of minimum wage  on 
employment and relative wages, see Card and Krueger (1995). Focusing on the effects of unions  and 
the  minimum  wage  on  relative  wages,  DiNardo,  For-tin, and  Lemieux  find  that  “labor  market 
institutions are at least as important as supply and demand considerations  in explaining  changes in the 
U.S. distribution  of wages from  1973 to 1992.” 
18. Summarizing research by Ferguson  and Rogers, David Gordon (1996) writes that “In  1975-76, 
an average of 84 percent of unfair labor practice complaints  against corporations  were sustained in 
whole  or  substantial  part,  favoring the union  side of the complaint.  By 1984-85, that  average had 
dropped to 52 percent. In 1975-76, similarly,  65 percent of “representation”  cases .  .  .  were decided 
in favor of the union position.  By  1984-85 that percentage  had declined to 35 percent.” 
19.  Summarizing  research  by Michael  Porter,  Bennett  Harrison  (1992)  writes  that  “real  capital 
formation in the U.S. since the 1960s has been distorted by rules, procedures,  and customs  governing 
private  sector  allocation  of capital.  .  .  .  In  1960, big institutional  stockholders  in the  U.S.-the 
pension and mutual funds-held  on to a share on average for seven years. By the  1980s  the average 
period had fallen to only about two years.” 
20.  Similarly,  as reported  by  the  New York Times,  Grumman’s manufacturing  operations  were 
transferred  from Long  Island to  Florida  and Louisiana  to  reduce  labor  costs  (McQuiston  1994). 
Another recent New York Times report documents the substantial  demand for extremely  low-skilled 
labor in the  1980s in Saipan and other U.S.-owned islands in the South Pacific where  some 20,000 
workers,  recruited  primarily  from  mainland  China, typically  put  in  six days  a week  for  half  the 
minimum wage making American brand-name clothes (Shenon 1994). As this demand for low-skilled 
workers  willing to  accept  poverty-level  wages  expanded  in these  offshore  U.S.  territories  in the 
1980s  low-skill  but living-wage  garment jobs decreased in the continental  United  States. 
21. The study defines displacement  as “job loss due to plant closings  or moves,  slack work,  or the 
abolishment  of their positions  or shifts.” 
22. High-wage, blue-collar workers were certainly hard hit by the 198Os,  but there is no evidence  that 
these  were  workers  with  specialized  skills or that  their  skills became obsolete  at a rate  that  was 
substantially  greater than in earlier decades. 
23.  This does not  necessarily  conflict  with the evidence that  the return  to  college  education  rose 
sharply in the  1980s. While growth in the “redundant” portion  of the college  educated labor supply 
will tend  to  reduce the absolute value of this return,  increasing earnings by the unaffected  (higher 
skill) part of the college educated pool could more than offset this effect. Furthermore,  the increasing 
competition for lower skill  jobs by the redundant  college educated workforce  will  also tend to lower 
the  wage  of those  with  low educational  attainment.  A large part  of the  growth  in the  wage  gap 
between  college  and high school degree holders was due to the decline in the earnings  of the latter 
(see Table  1). 34 
24. It is oflen claimed that the high unemployment  currently experienced by some European  nations 
indicates that a high price would be paid for maintaining  traditional  shelters from wage competition 
for low-wage  workers.  I am unaware  of any serious research that has made a compelling  case that 
wage inflexibility accounts for the recent increases in unemployment  in these countries.  But there is 
a recent  study that challenges  it. David Card, Francis Kramarz, and Thomas Lemieux  (1995) write 
that “taking the evidence  for the United  States, Canada, and France as a whole, we conclude  that it 
is very difficult to maintain the hypothesis that the ‘wage inflexibility’ in Canada and France translated 
into greater relative  employment  losses for less-skilled workers in these countries.” 36 
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.Table  2  Occupational  Employment  Shares In Manufacturing,  1983-88 
Occupational  Group  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Craft/Laborer  3.97  3.75  3.82  3.64  3.38  3.54 
Craft/Semi-Skill  0.59  0.60  0.61  0.61  0.60  0.60 
Technical/Clerical  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.29 
Professional/Managerial  0.76  0.71  0.72  0.74  0.73  0.72 








Figure  3a 
Computer  Investment  and  Low-Skill  Employment 
Shares  in  Manufacturing 
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Source: 
(1) Investment  in Office, Computing  and  Accounting  Machinery  in  Constant  1967  Dollars  (BEA)  per FdCTime  Equivalent Employee  (NIPA).. 
(2)  Occupation  shares  were  generated  from  the March  CPS  (1979-91)  for full-time  workers,  ages  IS+‘. Figure  3b 
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Computer  Investment  and  Low-Skill  Employment 
Shares  in  Services 
low-skill  white-cotlad  / 
$0  i  1  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Source:‘ 
(1) Investment  in Office, Computing  and  Accounting  Machinery  in Constant  1987  Dollars  (BEA)  per FWTime  Equivalent  Employee  (NIPA). 
(2)  Occupation  shares  were  generated  from  the March  CPS  (1979-91)  for  full-time  workers,  ages  16+‘. Table  3  Estimates  of Changes  in  Supply  and  Demand  for Low-Skill  Men 
in  the  1970s  and  1980s 
Schooling  1971-1979  19794987 
Less than a high school diploma 
Percent  change  in wage”  1.5 
Percent  change  in supply”  1.5 




High school graduates 
Percent  change  in wage”  0.8  -19.8 
Percent  change  in supply”  18.7  -40.9 
Percent  change  in demand  -4.6  -5.3 
a For  a worker  with  1 to 5 years  of experience. 
Source:  Lawrence  F. Katz  and  Kevin  Murphy,  “Changes  in Relative  Wages,  196s1987-Supply 
and  Demand  Factors,”  Quarterly JournalofEconomics  107, 1 (February):  35-78,  Table  I (Wage 
Changes),  Table  II (Supply  Shifts),  and  Table  VI  (Demand  Shifts). 